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Only recently, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) celebrated fifty 
years since the territory gained independence from Belgium. But the truth 
be told, Congo is not yet free. In more ways than are easily fathomable, the 
country continues to be buffeted by various reincarnations of greed and chaos 
– some externally driven, others internally motivated. This paper begins with a 
historical contextualisation of the conflicts in the DRC, before proceeding to take 
stock of the organisation’s balance sheet thus far as it grapples with imminent 
peacekeeping, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction challenges in the 
country. Successes achieved by the United Nations Organisation Mission in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) (now MONUSCO, the UN 
Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC) are then pitted against setbacks 
in this regard. Finally, a prognosis of the UN’s future role in the territory is built 
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on the template of the political, social and economic realities prevalent in the 
territory. 
Within the present dispensation in the Congo, how can the UN play a more 
effective role in disarming the country’s conflicts, while arming its capacity 
for lasting peace and security? In what ways can the broader international 
community muster its leverage more robustly in stemming the troubling tide of 
‘conflict resource hunting’ in the Congo? How can we look backward in order to 
see forward, or, in other words, what lessons can we draw from Hammarskjöld’s 
leadership in the first Congo war, and apply in current attempts towards the 
pacification of the Congo?
1. Introduction
In his eulogy to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), the pioneering 
social thinker Walter Lippmann (1961) summed up Dag Hammarskjöld’s legacy 
in this tribute:
Never before, and perhaps never again, has any man used the 
intense art of diplomacy for such unconventional and such novel 
experiments. The biggest experiment, for which in the end he gave 
his life, was to move the international society of the United Nations 
from having to choose between very difficult police action … to sole 
reliance on debate and verbal expression. He moved the UN onto the 
plane of executive action without large-scale war …[a]… movement 
from words to deeds, from general resolution to intervention …
Looking back at Dag Hammarskjöld’s well documented achievements and 
eventual sacrifice, Lippmann’s assessment is not so much a feat of brazen 
idolisation after all; and it is difficult to denude Hammarskjöld of his place in 
the pantheon of distinguished international service in the 20th century without 
downplaying the very mettle of the man, and his considerable work for humanity. 
Of course, and rightly so in line with traditions of objectivity, his contributions 
to world peace and security continue to be scrutinised – pitted against emerging 
critical voices attempting to sieve through the grains of his legacy. This is by no 
103
The Congo crisis, Dag Hammarskjöld’s legacy and the future role of MONUC in the DRC
means unexpected of a complex historical figure of his stature – a man whose 
life in the international spotlight, just as his death, remains shrouded in much 
debate, myth and contortions (Gibbs 1993; O’Brien 1962). Notwithstanding, 
fifty years have passed since his tragic demise, and it is perhaps prudent timing 
to undertake a rather ‘pious audit’ of his vision for world peace especially in the 
Congo1 – the still daunting Aegean stable at the heart of Africa for the attempted 
cleaning of which he eventually gave his life. An endeavour of this dimension 
is especially germane now when the UN stands taunted at the crossroads, 
painfully bogged down by serious and intensifying security challenges, alongside 
a growing credibility deficit resulting from controversies surrounding its work.
2. The Congo’s conflicts in historical perspective
The Congo’s current profile paints a sorry portrait of one of Africa’s most 
richly endowed countries, painfully reduced to what Chabal and Daloz (1999) 
have described as a ‘political economy of disorder’. Mobutu Sese Seko, for 
instance, might have been more known for introducing the Stalinist apparatus 
of repressive secret policing to sub-Saharan Africa, but he did much more to 
damage his country’s standing. Under Mobutu’s reign, the Congo effectively 
descended into a kleptocracy. Throughout his 32 years in charge of then Zaire, 
Mobutu did his best to put into practice this rather depraved philosophy of 
economic mismanagement through spirited embezzlement and siphoning of 
state funds, often in dimensions that took on a rather compulsive character. By 
the end of his reign, the strongman had lewdly ‘amassed a fortune estimated at 
$4 billion, [excluding] an array of grand villas in Europe and multiple palaces 
and yachts’ (Hochschild 2011). Today, the Congo’s weak and considerably inept 
central government stands woefully inadequate in the face of a growing need 
to correct deep-seated political, social and economic governance deficits. In 
the meantime, the country continues to crumble under the weight of endemic 
corruption. The virtual collapse of the formal economy and decaying state 
of infrastructures in the country is so staggering that it has been wryly said 
1 The Congo, DRC, DR Congo, Zaire are used interchangeably in this article to refer to the 
same territory. Zaire is preferentially used in segments where events are recounted that 
occurred in the course of Mobutu’s reign.
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that it is considerably easier to start a rebellion than a business in the Congo 
(Aljazeera 2010). 
This section attempts to provide a descriptive historical context of the multiple 
conflicts that have embroiled the Congo since the country gained independence. 
By virtue of the sheer pervasiveness of its involvement with the territory, 
Belgium stands out as a prime mover in any critical examination of the historical 
continuum of the Congo’s political and economic history. In fact, as Auma-
Osolo (1975) has tartly argued, ‘for 85 years, the Belgian colonial rule in the 
Congo perpetuated slavery and abuse of the Congolese people in repudiation 
of articles VI and IX of the Berlin General Act of 1885…[and as a consequence 
violated] international law’. Consequently, judging from the profound social, 
economic and political legacy of Belgian colonialism on the Congo, it seems 
fair to state that what DR Congo is or is not today, is to a considerable extent, a 
function of what Belgium did or did not do to the country. Belgian economic 
exploitation in the Congo, perhaps only matched by scant investment in social, 
educational and institutional structures, as well as the politics of repression 
and divide and rule, meant that Belgium was effectively designing the Congo 
to fail (Wanki, forthcoming). To this extent, any lucid attempt to develop a 
historical contextualisation of the Congo’s conflicts should logically begin with 
the genesis of Belgian imperialism over the territory. Belgian patronage over the 
Congo began as a King’s personal affair. Henry Stanley, on the behest of King 
Leopold II, enticed about 400 illiterate African chiefs along the Congo River 
to append their marks on a document ceding their lands to his trust (Anstey 
2006:40). This began the establishment of a ‘personal colony’ for Leopold II, 
who duplicitously invoked humanitarian considerations to justify his hold on 
the territory, effectively warding off other European imperialist ambitions, 
and legitimising his ownership in the course of the Berlin conference of 1884–
1885. In the following two decades, Leopold would exact an unholy order in 
the Congo enforced through systematic terror, forced labour and summary 
executions. His ruthlessness paid bounteous economic dividends and the 
Belgian monarch was able to amass for himself quite a sizeable fortune in 
rubber and ivory – unfortunately, at the cost of an estimated 10 million lives lost 
(Hochschild 2006:234; Anstey 2006:40). By 1908, the ensuing revelations about 
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institutionalised brutality in the Congo Free State forced the Belgian king to 
hand over his territory to the administration of the Belgian state, a year before 
his death. The territory was simply renamed the ‘Belgian Congo’.
Unfortunately, the Belgian state opted to sustain Leopold’s pedigree of coercion, 
and escalated its ruthlessness over the Congo. Meredith (2005:96) reports 
that Congo was managed de facto by ‘a small management group in Brussels 
representing an alliance between the government, the Catholic Church and the 
giant mining and business corporations, whose activities were virtually exempt 
from outside scrutiny’. Huge investment in industrial development flourished, 
and the industrial productivity index rose from 118 to 350 between 1948 and 
1958, and productivity effectively trebled over this period (Anstey 2006:41). To 
be fair, the buoyant industrial performance translated into some commendable 
social investments in the territory, and together with missionary bodies, a 
network of clinics and schools were established across the country (Meredith 
2005). However, a prima facie reading of these developments could be very 
deceptive, especially since there was very little opportunity for indigenous 
people to progress academically beyond the echelon of primary education 
(Bokamba 1986; Anstey 2006). Effectively, dismal Belgian underinvestment 
in the intellectual, social and political preparedness of the Congolese people 
shone out dramatically. At the Congo’s independence, there were practically no 
Congolese doctors, officers or school teachers in the military (Meredith 2005:19; 
Anstey 2006; Bokamba 1986), and just between six and thirty African college 
graduates in the territory (Van de Walle 2001:129). For a colony that had almost 
single-handedly fed Belgian economic growth for many years, the utter neglect 
of the Congo could only be conveniently described as sinister. By 1960, Belgium 
messily stepped out of Congo, granted ‘nominal’ independence to the colony 
and remained in the background where it continued to play an active role in the 
spectacle of chaos that prevailed after its departure. 
But the Congo’s predicaments were also significantly catalysed by the rudely 
complex realities of Cold War politics. By the time of the Congo’s first democratic 
elections in 1960, charismatic Patrice Lumumba’s scathing denunciation of 
Belgian colonialist ideology in the Congo propelled him into the limelight both 
as the uncontested voice of the Congo’s troubled masses, and as prime enemy 
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of Belgian and capitalist interests in the territory. The victory of his National 
Congolese Movement, and his ascendancy to the office of Prime Minister (along 
with Joseph Kasavubu as President), meant that the Belgians had reasons to 
worry aloud. Inspired by his tirades against colonialism, and by deep-seated 
grievances resulting from continuous Belgian domination of the military high 
command and civil service, a group of black soldiers in Leopoldville (present-day 
Kinshasa) mutinied, toppling their white commanders and engaging in violent 
attacks against Europeans and other Africans of different tribal or ideological 
persuasions. Belgium violated Congolese sovereignty five days later, dispatching 
Belgian troops into the Congo on the grounds that it was attempting to restore 
order. UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld joined a growing chorus of 
international critics in condemning Belgian intervention as aggressive behaviour, 
and as ‘a threat to peace and order in the region’ (quoted from Anstey 2006) 
– effectively responding to the Congolese Central Government’s appeal for 
assistance.2 Lumumba, initially resisting pressure from the mutineers to purge 
the military top brass of Belgians, eventually gave in as the situation became 
more acrimonious. On 8 July 1960, the Congolese Prime Minister sacked all 
Belgians from the military, appointing former Sergeant Victor Lundula to 
General of the Army staff, and Joseph Mobutu, Chief of Army Staff, by 10 July 
1960. Moise Tshombe, a mercurial renegade and Premier of the mineral-rich 
Katanga region, took advantage of the civil chaos, and with unconditional 
Belgian support, declared the unilateral secession and independence of the 
Katanga region on 11 July 1960 (Nugent 2004; Anstey 2006). Barely a few 
months into its independence, fledgling Congo had found itself lurching into 
full-scale chaos.
The events that followed represent one of the darkest chapters of Congolese 
history. Backed by the United States, Joseph Mobutu organised a military coup 
on 14 July 1960, placing himself at the helm of the Congolese state (Adebajo and 
Landsberg 2000). Hunting down Patrice Lumumba became his chief priority, 
and by 17 January 1961, he handed the former Premier over to Moise Tshombe. 
With direct Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Belgian involvement, Patrice 
Lumumba was assassinated. Empowered by American support and the loyalty of 
2 UN Doc. S/4382(1960).
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the military, Mobutu set out to consolidate his rule under the régime d'exception 
(equivalence of a state of emergency); riding roughshod over freedoms and civil 
liberties, and eventually establishing a brutal dictatorship which unleashed upon 
the backs of the Congo’s people for three decades, what Basil Davidson (1992) 
has termed ‘the curse of the nation state’. 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the United States cancelled its 
‘blank cheque policy’ to its African axis of capitalism, presaging what Bryden, 
N’diaye and Olonisaken (2008) have aptly described as ‘a corresponding shift 
in internal order of many African states’. This deprived at least some among the 
repressive African regimes of the financial and military wherewithal to crack 
down on dissent, and subsequently created space for budding clamour towards 
democratisation. Long overdue revolts against the status quo across Africa were 
fast-tracked, emboldening movements for freedom from Cairo to Cape Town.
In the case of the DRC, the force that initiated cracks on Mobutu’s 32 years-long 
reign of terror came from a rather inauspicious angle. As the simmering ethnic 
hatred between Hutus and Tutsis boiled over in the form of genocidal violence 
in Rwanda, the spillover reached Kivu province in the eastern parts of the 
Congo, such that ‘in a matter of days in October 1996, a large swathe of eastern 
Zaire erupted into an orgy of violence’ (Lemarchand 1997:173). As the Rwandan 
horror unfolded, the Hutu militia, Interahamwe, used Hutu refugee camps in 
Congolese territory as launch pads for a Tutsi massacre. In response, the Tutsi- 
led Armée Patriotique Rwandais invaded Zaire by October 1996 to put an end 
to the Hutu onslaught, and in the process, provided support to a coalition of 
internal Congolese armed dissidents (Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la 
Liberation du Congo-Zaire, AFDL) led by Laurent Désiré Kabila (Anstey 2006). 
Nelson Mandela attempted to broker a peace agreement, which foundered, and 
by 17 May 1997 Kabila’s forces had toppled Mobutu’s regime and forced him out 
(Anstey 2006). Declaring himself president, Kabila abrogated the Transitional 
Act altogether, effectively outlawing political opposition to his rule. He was soon 
to make a fatal mistake by expelling the Rwandan and Ugandan contingents 
which had propelled him to victory, and this plunged his fragile administration 
once again into civil war (Apuuli 2004). Partly benefiting from Angolan, 
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Chadian, Sudanese, Zimbabwean and Namibian support, Laurent Kabila 
managed to hold on to power, maintaining control over Kinshasa and indeed a 
sizeable patch of western Congo. The splintering of numerous armed factions, 
ex-Mobutu loyalists, and foreign troops rendered negotiations on the Congo’s 
conflict a complex labyrinth to chart. Expectedly, a second South African-led 
mediation attempt was scuppered.
The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement reached on 10 July 1999 ushered in a momentous 
breakthrough, and the United Nations Security Council expeditiously passed 
Resolution 1279 (S/RES/1279) of 30 November 1999, sanctioning the deployment 
of the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique 
du Congo (MONUC) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to strengthen the 
ceasefire. Supporting the government of the DRC and administered by the 
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the mission comprised 
four phases: establishing peace; supervising ceasefire; DDRRR (disarmament, 
demobilisation, reinsertion, rehabilitation, and reconciliation); and support to 
the DRC’s political transition and organisation of elections. The mission initially 
included 17 030 troops, 760 military observers, 391 police instructors, and 750 
members of constituted police units. UN Resolution 1756 (S/RES/2007) of 
15 May 2007 extended the mission until 31 December 2007, which has recently 
been re-mandated as MONUSCO to emphasise the stabilisation component.
This resolution originally provided useful breathing space for the battered 
country to stand on its feet again. Rather ironically, Laurent Kabila’s 
assassination in January 2001 by a bullet from his bodyguard’s rifle proved 
somewhat beneficial to Congo’s peace process as his more compromising son, 
Joseph Kabila, who took after him demonstrated more verve in the pursuit of 
meaningful democratic transition for the country (Anstey 2006). This new 
found tenacity to move forward beyond the prevalent political logjam yielded 
dividends, and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) was subsequently held at 
Sun City, South Africa (25 February to 19 April 2003). 
Joseph Kabila would subsequently go on to win the presidential elections in 
2006, although their results failed to mark new beginnings for the Congolese 
nation. The DRC continues to be ruffled by various dimensions of insecurity 
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ranging from pockets of violence across the country to full-scale war in the 
east. Cabals of warlords and spoilers continue to derail the country’s return to 
peace (Adebajo and Landsberg 2000) with campaigns of violence and brutality 
against unarmed civilians. Like most modern African wars, the perimeters of 
the Congo’s battlefields have extended to villages and communities where men, 
women and children are caught in the crossfire. In these attacks, the frequency 
of rapes and sexual violence – and the impunity with which such acts have 
been perpetuated against women – in places like Ituri and Kivu, have attained 
sub-human dimensions (Amnesty International 2007). Consequently, in ways 
that are tragically telling, women’s bodies have become the battlefields upon 
which the Congo’s wars are being fought. Even the strong UN presence has not 
dissuaded the dastardly human rights violations. 
3. Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN and the Congo crisis
As the foregone historical contextualisation has demonstrated in somewhat 
greater detail, the Congo’s current predicament is more or less the sour verdict 
of a long-storied process of virulent external interests and internal imbalances 
which continue to cast long shadows on the country’s future. But the Congo 
has also been the site of immense lessons for the international community. The 
territory is the place where the UN cut its teeth and tested the strength of its 
‘world society’, and, unfortunately, the reason for which the organisation lost 
its ebullient Secretary-General. Whether the topical Congo crisis measured 
Hammarskjöld as a man of inexorable grit and unperturbed tenacity, or as a 
rebellious maverick determined to chart his own path for the UN, is still open 
for debate. But what is certainly indubitable, is the fact that the first Congo crisis 
– as complex as it was – provided Hammarskjöld with the world’s podium to 
articulate a set of ideals and embark on a course of actions that would forever 
set him aside in a league of his own among the statesmen of his time. He might 
have himself (along with Patrice Lumumba), been one of the greatest symbolic 
casualties of the Congo war, but his handling of the conflict reveals important 
lessons for the UN’s work in the territory. 
In many respects, as the UN commemorates 50 years since Hammarskjöld’s 
passing, its current mission in the Congo (MONUSCO) has potential lessons to 
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learn from the false starts and successes of the first deployment (MONUC) in 
1960/61. This is all the more important in illuminating the path forward, even 
though the present context of international security, just as the UN’s work, has 
been tremendously transformed in our time; not the least by the ubiquitous 
forces of 21st century globalisation. There are many reasons why history should 
be kind to Dag Hammarskjöld. He built a reputation, even amongst his fiercest 
critics (Zacher 1970; Gibbs 2000) for routinely venturing out of the carapace 
of institutional comfort into the political minefields of practical action. As 
David Gibbs (2000:361) further stresses: ‘The Congo operation was the main 
substantive contribution of Hammarskjöld … and given the substantial scale, 
duration and scope of its activity, the operation was several decades ahead of its 
time … [Consequently, it is Hammarskjöld] more than any other single figure, 
who is cited as the principal inspiration to present-day peacekeeping efforts.’ 
It is easy to see him as a martyr for the course of collective human security, 
especially as he lost his life actively trying to attenuate a potential bloodbath in 
the Congo. In fact, much of his legend derives from these two sources, and it 
frankly amounts to little surprise when one of his successors, Kofi Annan (2001), 
lifts him up to the very quintessence of leadership in the UN. 
On 12 July 1960, the United Nations confronted a seminal moment in her young 
history. Invoking article 35, paragraph 2. under chapter IV of the United Nations 
Charter, which recognises the right of ‘A state which is not a member of the 
United Nations … to bring to the attention of the Security Council or General 
Assembly any dispute to which it is a party …’, President Kasavubu and Prime 
Minister Patrice Lumumba, on behalf of the Central Government of Congo, 
dispatched a cable to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, requesting 
assistance to ward off ‘Belgian aggression’. It read:
The Government of the Republic of Congo requests urgent dispatch 
by the United Nations of military assistance. This request is justified 
by the dispatch to the Congo, of metropolitan Belgian troops, in 
violation of the Treaty of Friendship signed between Belgium and 
the Republic of the Congo on June 29, 1960. Under the terms of the 
treaty, Belgian troops may only intervene on the express request 
of the Congolese government. No such request was ever made by 
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the Government of the Republic of Congo and we therefore regard 
the unsolicited Belgian action as an act of aggression against our 
country … The essential purpose of the requested military aid is 
to protect the national territory of the Congo against the present 
external aggression which is a threat to international peace. We 
Stress the extremely urgent need for the dispatch of United Nations 
troops to the Congo.3
A considerable amount of criticism has been levelled against Hammarskjöld 
and the United Nations regarding the handling of the first Congo crisis, which 
has generally vacillated between too much pro-activity on the part of the 
Secretary-General, sometimes beyond the bounds of his authority as sanctioned 
by the Charter, and too little initiative to act in the interest of peace. Auma-
Osolo (1975), for instance, criticised Hammarskjöld and the UN for being ‘too 
soft’ in condemning Belgian aggression after the receipt of the first cable from 
Lumumba and Kasavubu on 12 July 1960, even though barely two days later (14 
July 1960), the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted a resolution 
sanctioning the deployment of military aid to the Congo, while formally asking 
Belgium to pull out her forces from Congolese territory. Conversely, some 
scholars have rather maintained that in effect, Hammarskjöld actually moved 
the UN to act too soon; stating that in many ways, the Secretary-General actually 
went beyond the limits of constitutionality in his intervention in the first Congo 
crisis. E.M. Miller (quoted in Auma-Osolo 1975) contends that ‘neither … 
[the first] resolution nor any subsequent resolutions … expressly provided 
for a United Nations force ...’, stressing that none of the resolutions explicitly 
authorised the Secretary-General to compose, and dispatch a UN force to the 
Congo. To whatever degree one chooses to consider these arguments, it rests 
solely on the body of evidence available. Nevertheless, both arguments reveal 
important clues about Hammarskjöld’s ‘pro-activeness’, and to a considerable 
extent, his impartiality and neutrality. Empowered by article 99 of the Charter 
‘which allows the Secretary-General, on his own initiative, to bring matters to the 
Security Council’s attention when in his view they may threaten the maintenance 
3 See UN Doc. S/4382(1960). Further see UN Doc. A/4390/Add.1(1960).
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of international peace and security’ (Annan 2001), Hammarskjöld, as a seasoned 
European, pushed for more robust action against another European country, 
for the sake of collective security and justice. Consequently, on 18 July 1960, 
Hammarskjöld was pleased to report the arrival of 3 500 troops to the UNSC, 
and promised to send more.4
As Zacher (1970) points out, ‘Dag Hammarskjöld stressed the importance of an 
impartial and objective UN Secretariat, whose personnel would be able to adopt a 
truly international perspective’. This was very much evidenced in the composition 
of the UN peacekeepers for the First Congo Mission. Fully aware of the need to 
develop a more holistic and encompassing orientation for peacekeeping that 
went beyond just putting troops on the ground, Hammarskjöld effectively 
directed the UN towards establishing a UN Civilian Operations Programme in 
Congo, massively deploying hundreds of UN technocrats and specialists to assist 
the Congolese Government in areas of health, education, transport, emergency 
food relief and natural resources governance (UN 1985, UN 1961, cited in 
Gibbs 2000:364). For this, he unknowingly nurtured the complex process of 
multidimensional peacekeeping, the so-called peacebuilding approach, which 
typifies a bulk of the UN’s work today. As Lippmann (1961) further comments 
about the man he knew very well, ‘Dag Hammarskjöld … was not an innovator 
because he had an itch to change things. He was a political innovator because 
there was no decent alternative. He saw no alternative to intervention by the 
United Nations in a crisis where there was a bitter confrontation in the Cold 
War’.
It is very hard to squeeze down the leadership and legacy of a global figure like 
Hammarskjöld into a few pages; which is why many dimensions of his influence 
on the body politic of international relations and the UN’s work have not been 
addressed here. There is also a lurking possibility to consider the foregone 
discussions about his legacy as deprived of a solid critical dimension which could 
do more to engender the man’s shortcomings. That too, would not be entirely 
false! Indeed, the crux of this article is a ‘pious audit’ of Dag Hammarskjöld’s 
legacy; an appreciative enquiry, in a manner of speaking, of his contributions 
4 See UN Doc. S/4389 (1960).
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to the UN and to the Congo question, not a critical analysis of his leadership 
in the course of the first Congo war. Highly critical volumes of intellectual 
contributions already abound, with respect to Hammarskjöld’s leadership. 
Not so many contributions, however, show how the current UN mission in the 
Congo could harness positive lessons from Hammarskjöld’s legacy in the Congo, 
in charting the way forward toward sustained peace and security in the country.
4. The Congo today: Assessing the UN’s track record
The Congo is arguably the scene of the biggest human tragedy since the dawn of 
the 21st century, and with more than four million dead, it is easy to understand 
why many have described the conflicts there as the ‘third World War’ (Nugent 
2004; Anstey 2006). The largest ever UN peacekeeping force in history with an 
annual budget of $1 billion, the approval of the UNSC Resolution 1756, on 
15 May 2007, placed five core functions at the heart of MONUC’s mandate: 
guaranteeing the territorial security and integrity of DRC; assistance towards 
strengthening and consolidating democratic institutions and the rule of law; 
ensuring the protection of humanitarian personnel, civilians as well as the UN 
infrastructure and country personnel; the conduct of security sector reform; and 
the organisation of disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration/repatriation 
operations (de Carvalho 2007). The UN’s multidimensional force has played a 
crucial role in stabilising the country’s troubled security outlook, and in paving 
the way for eventual development. 
Major advances have been made towards the de-gunning and pacification of 
the country (Rouw and Willems 2010; Amnesty International 2007; Onana 
and Taylor 2008), and although significant challenges still obscure the efficient 
overhaul and reform of the Congolese security sector (Amnesty International 
2007; Onana and Taylor 2008), the UN at least, deserves a pat on the back for 
continuing to engage and fund the process. Less than a decade ago, the DRC 
was the laboratory of dangerous regional military experimentation, and at one 
point, Congolese soil provided barracks to the boots of at least eight regional 
armies occupying the country. Today, the UN has largely succeeded in cleaning 
the slate, forging much needed regional cooperation towards the stabilisation of 
the territory. In the area of DDR+, the country reaped some positive dividends, 
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especially linked to the repatriation of foreign fighters from the Congo, and the 
substantial reduction of armaments. These are laudable achievements within 
the current troubled context of the country; and the organisation’s decision to 
upgrade the mandate of its mission with a stabilisation component (MONUC 
to MONUSCO) as from 1 July 2010, is testament of its assessment of more 
propitious times ahead. Recognising the new phase reached by MONUC, the 
UNSC unanimously agreed that MONUC should become MONUSCO (United 
Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Congo) as from 1 July 2010. MONUSCO, 
authorised initially to stay in the Congo until 30 June 2011, will experience a 
drawdown of up to 2 000 UN military personnel from areas where security was 
deemed to have improved, to allow such withdrawal. The UNSC further decided 
that MONUSCO be comprised of additional appropriate civilian, judiciary and 
penitentiary components, a maximum of 760 military observers, 19 815 military 
personnel, 1 050 personnel of formed police units and 391 police personnel. 
Importantly, it authorised the mission to allocate a standby force ready for rapid 
re-deployment elsewhere in the country, while focusing the attention of its 
military capabilities in the unstable eastern part of the country. 
4.1 The Congo’s Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
The military has always played a central role in Congolese life (Onana and 
Taylor 2008; Amnesty International 2007). Consequently, complementary to the 
DDR process in the country, reforming the security sector is a matter of utmost 
priority, if the fledgling security gains are to be consolidated (de Carvalho 2007). 
MONUC, the Congolese government and other national and international 
partners displayed remarkable foresight placing DDR operations alongside SSR 
aspirations, since there is a profound nexus between both processes. However, 
the SSR process, just like the DDR, has been afflicted by a conundrum of 
setbacks, some of which are directly related to the chequered history of the 
Congolese army, while other are linked to serious misjudgement on the part of 
the national and international partners involved. Waves of defection from the 
army, for instance, especially in the two Kivu provinces and in the Northern part 
of the Katanga region which act as strongholds of the Mai Mai and RCD-Goma, 
have proven to be quite problematic. Furthermore, elements of the Congolese 
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army have been accused of perpetrating human rights abuses including rape, 
theft and harassment, and killings (Amnesty International 2007). Consequently, 
local people harbour serious distrust of the army’s role as guarantor of security, 
and by extension, MONUC’s. The SMI (Military Structure for [Re-]Integration) 
process too, was assailed by shortcomings, especially those linked to failures 
and compromises in the vetting process of former ex-combatants, before their 
reintegration into the army (Amnesty International 2007). As a result, there have 
been accusations that certain individuals who committed serious acts of human 
rights violations have simply received legitimisation through the military, and 
that the UN has done nothing to redress this.
Key to the Congo’s SSR process is the development of a national army that is 
truly inclusive, disciplined, professional, human rights-based; and which can 
eventually serve as an instrument of enhancing the country’s security, defending 
its territorial integrity, hence creating conducive space for peace and development 
to flourish. These expectations are well grounded in the Congolese Ministry of 
Defence’s Operational Plan and the Law on the General Organisation of Defence 
and the Armed Forces (Amnesty International 2007). Unfortunately, endemic 
corruption, coupled with poor pay packages, has simply forced many soldiers 
to use their weapons in making a living. Also, the thorny issue of the Garde 
Présidentielle is setting a worrying precedent. This guard is an elite force trained 
by Angolan forces and charged with presidential security. However, elements of 
the presidential guard consider themselves a special army within the Congolese 
army, above the law, and have consequently resorted to acts that terrorise the 
masses. For this, they have earned the notorious appellation ‘ampicilline’ (the 
name of a medicine) by the inhabitants of Kinshasa. MONUC is currently under 
pressure to influence the redress of such conduct. Finally, General Nkunda’s 
obstinacy, as well as the refusal of his renegade forces to be part of the national 
army, exacerbated the difficulties currently facing MONUC and the government 
with respect to setting up a unified and well-trained army. Many armed groups 
still have child soldiers within their ranks, and the arduous task of completely 
relieving the Congo’s children of the burdens and brutality of wars, is at the 
moment, still a bridge too far for the UN to cross.
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4.2 The Congo’s elections
Elections are crucial to the process of democratic consolidation and renewal, 
and they serve as vital instruments for enhancing the transition from conflicts 
to post-conflict dispensations. However, the Congo’s experimentation with 
the enterprise of democratic elections has not always countenanced positive 
outcomes in terms of democratic consolidation; and the country’s own 
chequered history stares brutally right in the face of good governance. 
Notwithstanding this troubled context of elections organisation, the United 
Nations earned wide acclaim for mustering international attention and support 
towards overcoming the colossal logistical requirements of free and fair elections 
in the Congo in 2006. Some 269 parties, 33 presidential candidates and roughly 
9 700 parliamentary aspirants throughout 25 provinces amounted to the largest 
UN investment ever in a project of the calibre. An estimated 15 500 peacekeepers 
were deployed across the country for several years, including 324 civilian police, 
520 UN military observers, and 2 493 civilian staff. Over 200 000 electoral staff 
and 45 000 police were involved, with 90% of the voting population turning out 
to cast their vote. Whether or not the impetus and political capital generated in 
the course of the last elections have actually translated into meaningful progress 
on the ground is open for debate. The country currently stands at the cusp 
of yet another election of mammoth proportions, announced for November 
2011, in the face of mounting security challenges and growing uncertainty over 
the UN’s future in the country. In eastern Congo, Nyambura Githaiga (2011) 
recently reported that the ‘elections agenda has been eclipsed by recent [tragic] 
developments in the mining sector ... lingering insecurity, and underdevelopment’. 
The present angst over the prospects of free and fair elections in the DRC and 
the political and security implications of its aftermath are justified. By virtue 
of its sweeping presence in the political life of the Congolese state, it is almost 
certain that the UN Mission in the country will have axes to grind with many 
critics should things go wrong.
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4.3 Enforcing an arms embargo, territorial security and civilian 
protection
The Congo still harbours a significant number of foreign fighters and 
mercenaries serving various interests, ranging from illegal resource mining 
to engagement in actual military campaigns. This has encouraged the influx 
of arms across the DRC border, in violation of the arms embargo there, and 
MONUC troops have been implicated in some of the arms flows, especially in 
the east of the country (de Carvalho 2007; Boshoff and Vircoulon 2004), in areas 
like Kivu and Ituri. The arms embargo has once again been extended, although 
there is little evidence that it is realistically stemming the tide of illicit arms flow 
into the DRC. 
Another grave challenge is the issue of civilian protection. Ultimately, the 
success or failure of MONUC’s mission in Congo will be judged against progress 
made in protecting civilian populations from physical and psychological harm. 
The recurrence of grave human rights violations, and the impunity with which 
they are committed, has provoked an international outcry and consternation. 
Arbitrary executions of civilians by various armed groups are rife, brazen 
extortion is common, and of course, the serious issue of rape (de Carvalho 2007). 
Unfortunately, an alarming number of reports from victims of these violations 
point embarrassingly to certain elements within the Congolese national army 
(FARDC) and police; as well as militiamen and rebel groups locked in armed 
confrontation with the Congolese government, especially in places like Kivu, in 
the east. To be fair, MONUC continues to play a key role in investigating and 
reporting such allegations, although it is difficult to exact justice to perpetrators, 
since many government officials are often allegedly involved in such violations 
(de Carvalho 2007). Importantly, MONUC must endeavour to put its own house 
in order. Many allegations implicating United Nations civilian and peacekeeping 
personnel in illegal mineral mining transactions (de Carvalho 2007) grossly 
shame the mission’s credibility as a point of reference in the country. 
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4.4 The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) 
programme
The importance of the DDR process to any quest for lasting peace in the DRC 
has already been abundantly espoused in academic literature and by facts on the 
ground (Wanki forthcoming; Amnesty International 2007; Anstey 2006; Rouw 
and Willems 2010). The 1999 Lusaka ceasefire agreement set the framework for 
the implementation of the Congo’s DDR process, and the extremely complicated 
context of the Congolese conflict led to the implementation of a DDR+ (see 
Centre for International Cooperation and Security 2006; Hanson 2007; Bouta 
2005; Douma and Van der Laar 2008, Willems et al. 2009).
Backed by UN guidance and support, a national commission for the 
implementation of the DDR process in Congo (CONADER) was eventually 
established by a series of presidential decrees (December 2003), and ultimately 
charged with the administration of the national DDR programme (PNDDR), 
which was adopted by another presidential decree (May 2004). This effectively 
created a nation-wide legal framework under the supervision of the Congo’s UN 
mission. Recognising the link between DDR and SSR (Onana and Taylor 2008), 
a military component was created alongside (Structure Militaire d’Integration, 
SMI) charged with the military dimension of the process (World Bank 2009). 
The joint PNDDR/SMI process commenced work with a caseload figure of 
approximately 300 000 ex-combatants, and making provision for about 150 000 
ex-fighters which included 30 000 child soldiers. Generally, the commencement 
of DDR programmes in the Congo was met with widespread enthusiasm, despite 
serious security risks confronting combatants as they streamed to MONUC/
CONADER-run Centres de transit et d’orientation (CTOs, disarmament and 
demobilisation centres) to hand in their weapons (Amnesty International 2007). 
4.4.1 Miscalculations about Disarmament
A major flaw with the Congolese disarmament process was its hyper-focus on 
guns, and perhaps, in comparison, relatively limited focus on the combatants 
themselves. It is understandable that owing to the bouts of violence and 
human rights violations prevalent in eastern Congo, MONUC was mandated 
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to prioritise the de-gunning of the region. Consequently, combatants were 
strictly required to present their weapons in order to be granted access to the 
PNDDR-run CTO. Many combatants who could not present weapons were 
summarily sent away (Rouw and Willems 2010; Van Puijenbroek et al. 2008), 
and given limited options of joining a crash UNDP-supervised manual labour-
for-cash scheme. There are two pitfalls with the gun-in-the-hand prerequisite 
for disarmament. The first derives from the fact that not all combatants own 
guns; in fact more than twenty combatants, especially those from the Mai Mai, 
could share a single rifle while in the jungle (Rouw and Willems 2010). The 
second has to do with specific choice of instruments for violence. Nowhere has 
it been pre-ordained that being a militiaman requires one to only possess a gun. 
Machetes (which by the way are designed to be agricultural implements) have 
equally been used repeatedly before in African warfare to inflict tragedies in 
proportions that have been quite dispiriting, as was the case in the course of 
the Rwandan genocide. Mai Mai militiamen, for instance, armed with armes 
blanches who were turned away simply resorted to stealing the identity cards of 
demobilised people to secure benefits (Rouw and Willems 2010). All together, the 
above considerations point to a quintessentially myopic misreading of the local 
context of the Congolese war, which could most probably have been avoided had 
MONUC and its partners actively involved local actors in their planning.
In another respect, the DDR programme in Ituri – whose chief aim was to disarm 
combatants, reduce the proliferation of weapons and pacify the region – initially 
set out to handle a targeted caseload of 15 000 elements of armed groups who had 
endorsed the Acte d’engagement de Kinshasa. By June 2005 when the programme 
ended, 15 811 combatants had been demobilised, unfortunately with only an 
estimated 20% of firearms being secured. In the Eighteenth Report of the United 
Nations Secretary-General on the Situation in the Congo, he highlighted the 
prevailing potential for re-escalation of violence in the region, given that ‘70% 
of the 6,200 weapons collected were defective and not in a serviceable condition’ 
(quoted in Amnesty International 2007), and hence there was a strong possibility 
that ex-combatants might have gamed the system. Insecurity continues to ruin 
lives, rapes are common, and young people continue to experiment with deadly 
armed brigandage (Van Puijenbroek et al. 2008; Bouta 2005:28). 
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4.4.2 Missed opportunity: Local grassroots intelligence 
By failing to address the marginalisation of local peoples in the DDR process, 
MONUC missed a golden opportunity to harness local grassroots intelligence 
on weapon stockpiles, rebel activity as well as strategies for encouraging more 
voluntary disarmament and demobilisation of members of armed groups. 
Local communities have better knowledge of the activities of their constituent 
members; are well aware of those members who own firearms illegally; and 
possess key information on weapon caches within their communities that 
will remain unknown to any foreigner, the urban expert, or the MONUC 
disarmament specialist. This wealth of knowledge could be useful for effective 
disarmament as well as following up community demobilisation processes. 
However, as Rouw and Willems (2010:27) once again submit, ‘this function 
of the community seems largely untapped’, owing to the marginalisation of 
grassroots involvement in, and ownership of, the DDR process. A Congolese 
community, in the course of a recent research exercise, asked a telling question 
as ‘to whom they should go right now, with their knowledge of illegal firearms; 
the FARDC or MONUC?’ (Rouw and Willems 2010:27) 
4.4.3 The Demobilisation Process: A litany of broken promises
The numerous documented accounts of public agitations in the Congo as a result 
of problems associated with the conduct of demobilisation operations (Amnesty 
International 2007; Onana and Taylor 2008; Van Puijenbroek et al. 2008; Bouta 
2005; Rouw and Willems 2010) behoves us to take a more nuanced look at 
the process. On 21 May 2005, 50 demobilised men delegated by their fellow 
colleagues stormed the CONADER office in Bunia, venting their grievances and 
denouncing the snail pace of the demobilisation process. 
Anger over unpaid dues became viral, spreading to places like Kasenyi, Mahagi, 
Kwandroma and Aveba, where many hundreds of demobilised ex-combatants 
effectively demonstrated against delays in the payment of filet de sécurité.5 But 
disappointment over delays in the payment of dues is just one facet of a contagion 
of local distrusts with respect to the demobilisation process, which threatens the 
5 ‘Security net’ – money paid to cover initial living expenses immediately after demobilisation
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centre core of the entire process. Promises made to locals, especially those linked 
to the bliss of reintegration are yet to be fulfilled many years after, and local 
Congolese have justifiably begun pointing fingers of distrust at UN officials. In 
cases where reintegration assistance was provided, the feedback received has 
not been encouraging. For instance, where vocational career kits have been 
provided, they usually did not match the professional orientation, needs and 
desires of the demobilised (Rouw and Willems 2010). The growing perception 
is that the national agency, CONADER, was riddled with serious and systemic 
administrative and mismanagement issues, largely as a result of ineffective UN 
oversight. This led to the siphoning of significant amounts of ex-combatants’ 
resources into private pockets (Rouw and Willems 2010).
Local communities too feel that while they are not being consulted in the 
DDR process; that the ‘demobilized are just dumped into their communities 
while they still have the esprit of the military’ (Rouw and Willems 2010). One 
community member climaxes this resentment thus: ‘They first went out to loot 
and steal, and now they receive support through DDR. They gain twice while the 
communities suffer’ (Rouw and Willems 2010). There is consequently an urgent 
need for MONUSCO to sensitise local communities and traditional leaders on 
the need to be more receptive to these returnees, and the benefits of helping 
them integrate effectively to the overall peace process. 
4.4.4 The marginalisation of local contexts
Reintegration is easily the most complicated and controversial of the three DDR 
phases. Actually, quarrels over the DDR process begin right at the semantic level 
where there are cries to clearly problematise and conceptualise the meaning of 
‘R’ in the DDR. While in the English acronym ‘R’ denotes ‘Reintegration’, the 
French ‘R’ stands for Réinsertion, which is not the same. 
The semantic debates aside, MONUC-run reintegration activities have been 
criticised for disregarding the local context within which ex-combatants live in 
the rush to secure peace (Centre for International Cooperation and Security 
2006), even though there are clear guidelines prescribing that reintegration be 
regarded as a long-term process. Local people have also faulted the process for 
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not taking their views into account in DDR implementation. Rouw and Willems 
(2010) highlight a multiplicity of instances where the UNDP and its partners 
got the priorities of local Congolese people wrong, such as: training people in 
electrical skills even though they came from communities and villages without 
electricity, and donating an electricity-powered grinding mill to a community 
that had never been connected to electricity supply.
The search for durable employment opportunities for ex-combatants is a key issue 
inhibiting their holistic reintegration into normal civilian life. In light of this, it 
is easy to see how wanting in scope and relevance the UNDP three days course in 
preparation for civilian life conducted in Ituri, in 2007, was. As Marriage (2007, 
in Rouw and Willems 2010) further explains, each ex-combatant was provided 
with $50, and with a month’s food supply for their families. One Nationalist and 
Integrationist Front (FNI) spokesman struck a vital nerve when he questioned 
whether such little assistance was expected to transform their esprit de la guerre 
(emphasis mine; cited in Bouta 2005:28). There have consequently been calls for 
the UN to establish community-based support centres to help ex-combatants 
continue updating the productive skills acquired at transit centres. 
4.4.5 Who’s in, who’s out? 
The cumbersomeness of the DDR funding and implementation contracting 
chain in the Congo is outrageous (Douma and Van der Laar 2008; Willems 
et al. 2009:6). For example the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) operates in Congo’s DDR process with two US-based 
profit organisations – ARD and MSI – who, through other chains, function with 
international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), who in their turn, now 
collaborate with, and fund the works of local NGOs (Rouw and Willems 2010). 
This complicates the implementation chain, and alienates local grassroots based 
NGOs many layers away from the actual design, execution and monitoring 
process of the programme (Van Puijenbroek et al. 2008:16–17). This encourages 
corruption and excessive profiteering amongst the international players involved 
with post-conflict development and makes international partners vulnerable to 
serious mistakes linked to the understanding of the local context. A recurrent 
complaint amongst local chiefs, NGOs and even some international partners 
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in Ituri, was that the UNDP routinely provides incorrect lists of ex-combatants 
and, consequently, often selects ineligible beneficiaries for their projects. 
The truth of the matter is that most international organisations currently face 
a credibility deficit in the eyes of the local Congolese. The general feeling is that 
these organisations spend huge sums of money footing the cost of their personal 
comfort, at the expense of actually carrying out the development tasks for which 
they have been deployed. To corroborate this position, a UN official in the 
Congo recently admitted that about a third of MONUC’s budgetary allocations 
were dedicated to transportation costs alone (Rouw and Willems 2010), and 
many other international partners spent at times exorbitant sums on chauffeurs 
for their staff. These could be used in supporting local NGOs to carry out DDR 
work (Caramés and Sanz 2008). In contrast, the local peoples’ orientation of the 
UN Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) articulates the necessity of prioritising 
local involvement and needs in total 698 times throughout the entire volume 
(Rouw and Willems 2010).
4.5 Rape, rape, and re-rape: Giving meaning to the words ‘Never again’
Few events have embarrassed the UN’s mission and questioned its credibility 
more than the revelations of systematic rape and sexual violence, especially in 
places where UN forces were supposed to be exacting oversight (Pflanz 2010). 
Rape is being deployed as a weapon of war. As Carlsen (2009:1) points out: ‘The 
eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is home to some of the 
world’s most horrific documented cases of sexual violence against women’. The 
scale, and the dehumanising dimensions which these take, clearly corroborates 
the assertion that women’s bodies are the battlefields on which the Congo’s wars 
are fought. Rape is more than just non-consensual sex – the bodily harm (e.g. 
fistula), and psychological sequelae associated with violent rapes tend to haunt 
the victims for the rest of their lives. Accompanying this, the stigmatisation 
intensifies the brunt of misery and hardship. In a recent study (Vinck et al. 2008) 
one-third of respondents reported that they were not ready to admit victims of 
sexual violence into their communities. The UN mission is sufficiently mandated 
by UNSC resolution 1325 to take all steps necessary to halt the perpetuation 
of rape. However, the alarming recurrence of sexual violence in the country, 
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especially those committed in areas under the jurisdiction of UN forces, poses 
telling questions about the mission’s credibility. There are justified doubts 
regarding MONUC’s capacity to live up to its expectations, and give meaning to 
the words ‘never again’ with respect to the rape of Congolese women.
5. Hammarskjöld’s legacy and the future of MONUSCO
MONUC, now MONUSCO, is still confronting a barrage of challenges it has to 
overcome in order to fulfil its mandate while improving the country’s security, 
peace and development outlooks. Like most countries emerging from histories 
of intractable conflicts, the DRC’s risk of relapsing into violence is high (Collier 
and Hoeffler 2004). The UN is facing rising peacekeeping demands in the face 
of supply that cannot keep pace. Renewed violence in other places puts the UN 
system under increasing pressure to ration resources. Consequently, MONUSCO 
will have to be flexible in the discharge of its functions, adapt effectively to the 
changing political, economic and social context of Congolese society, and learn 
to be innovative. The recent decision to keep a standby rapidly deployable 
brigade of peacekeepers from which the mission can call, in the protection of 
civilians, is a laudable innovation. Furthermore, MONUSCO will have to learn 
to adapt more effectively to the local context of Congolese society and partner 
more effectively with local actors in correcting some of the programming deficits 
of the DDR and SSR processes.
As Dag Hammarskjöld succinctly declared, the ‘[United Nations] should be the 
eye of nations, to keep watch upon the common interests, an eye that does not 
slumber, an eye that is everywhere, watchful and attentive’ (quoted from Falkman 
2005). It is clear that MONUC slumbered in many areas where the organisation 
was supposed to be alert. For instance, while Congolese women were being 
raped systematically; while some of its officials and peacekeepers indulged in 
the trafficking of conflict minerals; and in the DDR and SSR implementation 
processes. MONUSCO must now learn to be pro-active, versatile and robust, 
especially in protecting civilians, disarming child soldiers, and guarding women 
against rape and sexual violence. It should now live up to its chapter VII mandate, 
and prioritise the safety and security of the Congo’s people above all else.
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The Congo war, like conflicts in other African countries, has not received the 
same measure of attention accorded by the international community to conflicts 
elsewhere; even though it has produced more tragic consequences and tended 
to be more brutal. The UN Charter recognises the fundamental equality of all 
human beings and all member states, and dedicates itself to defending the same. 
It is safe to contend, with the historical evidence available, that in attending 
to the serious security challenges facing the Congo in 1960, Hammarskjöld 
displayed a profound dedication to the principles of equality of all states and 
peoples, functional neutrality in the discharge of his duties, and impartiality in 
the pursuit of world peace and security. The UN’s role in places like Rwanda, 
Darfur, and the Congo continues to raise eyebrows on the organisation’s true 
commitments to protecting African lives and ensuring security in the continent. 
American, British, Chinese, French and Belgian economic interests (all of these 
countries but one being permanent members of the security council) currently 
make huge amounts of profit from the Congo’s conflict-causing resources; which 
in turn, are fuelling human rights violations and holding the country’s progress 
down. If Hammarskjöld were alive today, there is no doubt that he would call 
on these countries to be sincere in their intentions, support the UN’s mission 
wholeheartedly, and stop playing ‘games of blood’ in the Congo.
6. Conclusion
More than half a century ago, in the introduction to his Annual Report to the 
United Nations (1956–1957), Dag Hammarskjöld professed that ‘the greatest 
need today is to blunt the edges of conflict among nations, not sharpen them’. 
He went on to add that, ‘if properly managed, the United Nations [could] serve 
a diplomacy of reconciliation better than other instruments available to nation 
states’. While today’s world has changed with the spectre of a nuclear war between 
superpowers far faded from our memories, violent conflicts continue to haunt 
mankind, often on scales and depths that are too horrific to savour. The patterns 
of our wars have changed – from mostly interstate conflicts as they used to be 
in Hammarskjöld’s time – to intrastate conflicts today. But if he were alive, he 
would not be too myopic to our new trends of intrastate wars, since he gave his 
life trying to attenuate the first Congo War – a classic case of intrastate conflict, 
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feeding on systems of internal and external interests. Yet, Hammarskjöld would 
evidently be distressed by the fact that the Rwandan genocide was allowed to 
occur; and that genocides, such as those in Darfur, still shame the conscience 
of humanity. Even worse, that the Congo – the land for which he gave his last 
full measure of sacrifice – continues to be harrowed by various incarnations of 
internal and external greed, complacency, corruption and misrule. He would 
definitely rebuke the UN for not playing a role robust enough in steering the 
country’s drive towards peace and security, even as he would not hesitate to give 
up his life again for a more sustainable peace, security and development for the 
Congo. But since Hammarskjöld cannot be here, we must endeavour to learn 
from his legacy and then perhaps, build a more secured and peaceful Congo 
worthy of his great sacrifice. 
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